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PUNISHING PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES FOR UNLAWFUL

PROMOTION OF APPROVED DRUGS:
WHY THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT IS THE

WRONG RX
VICKI W. GIRARD*
ABSTRACT

This Article criticizes the shift in focus from correction and compliance to
punishment of pharmaceutical companies allegedly violating the Food, Drug, &
Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) prohibitions on unlawful drug promotion. Traditionally,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has addressed unlawful promotional
activities under the misbranding and new drug provisions of the FD&C Act.
Recently, though, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has expanded the purview
of the False Claims Act to include the same allegedly unlawful behavior on the
theory that unlawful promotion "induces" physicians to prescribe drugs that result
in the filing of false claims for reimbursement. Unchecked and unchallenged, the
DOJ has negotiated criminal and civil settlements with individual pharmaceutical
companies ranging from just under tens of millions to billions of dollars.
Companies settle these cases largely to avoid the potential loss of revenue
associated with the exclusion regime administered by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, under which companies risk losing the right to have
their products reimbursed under federal health care programs. Thus, the willingness
of companies to settle claims allows the DOJ to employ an enforcement approach
that circumvents judicial review of its legal theories and procedures. This Article
discusses the traditional enforcement methods employed by the FDA, as well as the
more recent DOJ prosecutions under the False Claims Act. Although it concludes
that the FD&C Act should provide the sole means for punishing unlawful drug
promotion, it also suggests that when prosecuting pharmaceutical companies under
either Act, the government must avoid the temptation to mine companies for large
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settlements in lieu of developing a more coherent and responsible enforcement
strategy.
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INTRODUCTION

The promotion and advertising of prescription drugs in the United States is
big business. According to one estimate from 2006, spending on pharmaceutical
promotion exceeded $29.9 billion,' including more than $7 billion spent on
promotion targeting prescribing physicians and other health care professionals and
another $4.2 billion attributable to direct-to-consumer advertising.2 Other estimates
calculate promotional expenditures at more than twice that amount.3 Astoundingly
large budgets aside, however, pharmaceutical companies are limited in their
promotional options. They are not free to operate with Fifth Avenue abandon or to
employ the kinds of exaggerated promotional claims associated with cosmetic and
other non-health care related products. As purveyors of cures and preventions for
serious diseases and health conditions, the pharmaceutical industry is entrusted
with obligations far beyond those of whitening teeth, preventing wrinkles, and
stopping odor.4 We expect public health and safety to come first and demand that
companies promote prescription drugs within the parameters established under the
federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act).5 When the limits on promotion
are exceeded, we rely on the government to step in and ensure compliance.
However, the methods used to achieve compliance matter, and the government's
most recent efforts to enforce the FD&C Act are troubling. In particular, the
government's shift in emphasis from correction and compliance to punishment, 6 its
use of the False Claims Act to prosecute violations of the FD&C Act,7 and its
reliance on negotiated settlements to circumvent judicial review of its new
enforcement approach 8 deserve careful scrutiny.

1. Estimates are based on those provided by Intercontinental Marketing Services (IMS), one of the
primary authorities on pharmaceutical promotional expenditures. See Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade
of Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising of PrescriptionDrugs, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 676 tbl.1 (2007).

Approximately $18.4 billion (in retail value) of that amount was devoted to promotional free samples
distributed to patients through physicians. Id.
2. Id. at 676 tbl.l.
3. Marc-Andr6 Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
PharmaceuticalPromotionExpenditures in the United States, 5 PLoS MED. 29, 29-31, 30 tbl. 1 (2008),

available
at
http://medicine.plosjoumals.org/archive/1 549-1676/5/1/pdf/10. 137 1Journal.pmed.
0050001-S.pdf.
4. For example, more than 29 million Americans have been prescribed the statin drug Lipitor,
used to lower LDL cholesterol and fight the plaque that contribute to heart disease. Research on Lipitor,
http://www.lipitor.com/about-lipitor/clinical-trials.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
5. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 352, 355 (2006), amended by Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 940, 942 (2007). Over-the-counter drugs
are also subject to promotional restrictions but are not included within the scope of this Article, which
focuses solely on prescription drugs.
6. See infra Part lIl.A.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part III.D.
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The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the federal agency
authorized under the FD&C Act to regulate the promotion of prescription drugs. 9
Consistent with its mission to protect and promote the public health, the FDA
exercises its authority by "assuring [that] prescription drug information is truthful,
balanced and accurately communicated. This is accomplished through a
comprehensive surveillance, enforcement and education program, and by fostering
better communication of labeling and promotional information to both healthcare
professionals and consumers."' 0 The "labeling and promotional information"
referenced by the FDA, on which this Article focuses, falls into two categories: (1)
promotional labeling, and (2) advertising."
Promotional labeling generally refers to everything except FDA-approved
labeling. 12 FDA-approved labeling for prescription drugs includes professional
labeling (i.e., the full prescribing information that accompanies every prescription
drug) 13 and consumer-oriented labeling (i.e., "Medication Guides," which are
required by the FDA to ensure the safe and effective use of certain prescription
9. 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(a), 352(n), 393(a)-(d) (2006). The Federal Trade Commission is responsible
for the advertising of over-the-counter drugs. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 52 (2006); Thompson Med. Co. v. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, 791 F.2d 189, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539 (Sept. 16,
1971).
10. Div. of Drug Mktg., Adver. & Commc'ns, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Drug Marketing,
Advertising, and Communications Research, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/
ucm090142.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009). The Food and Drug Administration's Division of Drug
Marketing, Advertising, and Communications (DDMAC) is responsible for the promotion and
advertising of drugs. Id. The Office of Compliance for Biological Quality (OCBQ) handles the same
issues for biological products. OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL 1-4 to -5 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM074345.pdf.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: "HELPSEEKING" AND OTHER DISEASE AWARENESS COMMUNICATIONS BY OR ON BEHALF OF DRUG AND

DEVICE FIRMS 2 (2004). The FDA uses these two categories to classify the multitude of promotional and
marketing materials that must be submitted to the agency at the time of initial dissemination or
publication. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FORM FDA 2253: TRANSMITTAL OF ADVERTISEMENTS
AND PROMOTIONAL LABELING FOR DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS FOR HUMAN USE (2008), available at

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM083570.pdf.
12. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., supranote 11,at 2.
13. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006). The requirements for professional labeling are set forth by
regulation. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2008). Also included in this category of labeling is the "patient package
insert," which is an extension of the professional labeling in that it is designed for patients using lay
language. See Experimental Evaluation of Variations in Content and Format of the Brief Summary in
Direct-to-Consumer Print Advertisements for Prescription Drugs, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,889 (Mar. 14, 2007);
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BRIEF SUMMARY:
DISCLOSING RISK INFORMATION IN CONSUMER-DIRECTED PRINT ADVERTISEMENTS 4 (2004), available

at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/
UCM069984.pdf. "Patient package inserts" may be voluntary or required. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§
310.501, .515, .516 (requiring the provision of a patient package insert for oral contraceptives,
estrogens, and progestational drug products).
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drugs). 14 As the catch-all for everything except FDA-approved labeling,
promotional labeling covers most of the labeling information provided to
consumers and healthcare professionals. 15 The FDA's expansive authority over
promotional labeling is founded, in part, on the FD&C Act's broad definition of
labeling as "all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any
article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article." 16 For
prescription drugs, which are articles under the FD&C Act, 17 the term
accompanying does not require the actual physical attachment of information to a
drug. Rather, virtually any information disseminated by or on behalf of the
manufacturer, packer, or distributor that supplements or explains a drug may be
said to accompany the product and thus constitute labeling.' 8 The form and manner
of information encompassed under this view includes all varieties of printed, audio,
or visual matter. 19
Promotional materials that do not qualify as labeling are regulated as
advertising by the FDA. Although neither advertisement nor advertising is defined
in the FD&C Act, section 352(n) and the implementing regulations demonstrate the
broad nature and scope of information regulated as advertising. 20 Advertisements
subject to section 352(n) include those "in published journals, magazines, other
periodicals, and newspapers, and advertisements broadcast through media such as
In addition to these
radio, television, and telephone communication systems.'
traditional media sources, "FDA also regulates advertising conducted by sales
representatives, on computer programs, through fax machines, or on electronic
bulletin boards. 2 Thus, in combination with its authority over promotional
labeling, the FDA's regulatory oversight of prescription drug marketing extends to
practically every type of material and media imaginable.23

14. 21 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, .20.
15. See id. § 202.1(1) (subjecting prescription drug advertisements, including brochures, booklets,
mailing pieces, detailing pieces, bulletins, catalogues, calendars, and film to FDA regulation).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006).
17. Id. § 321(g)(1).
18. See Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1948).
19. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n), amended by Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 940, 942 (2007); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(1)-(5). Exemptions from some of
these requirements are provided for specific types of promotional material such as "reminder" ads,
which are not required to disclose risk information. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 200.200, 201.100(f), 202.1(e)(2)(i).
21. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1).
22. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., THE CDER HANDBOOK 56 (2008).

23. Although internet information falls under FDA's regulatory authority, the FDA has equivocated
on its precise legal status, suggesting that it may be labeling or advertising depending on the
circumstances. Id. at 61. Among the policies and guidance currently under development at FDA's
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and
Communications, is how advertising and promotion of FDA-regulated products will be regulated on the
tntemet Id
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Given the enormous range of materials regulated as promotional labeling and
advertising, the FDA depends heavily on voluntary compliance by pharmaceutical
companies to market products according to the requirements of the FD&C Act.24 In
designing promotional materials, companies rely on implementing regulations,
FDA guidance documents, and other formal and informal consultations with the
agency on specific questions about appropriate promotional choices. A small
percentage of promotional materials are pre-approved by the FDA.26 Companies
submit all other promotional materials for prescription drugs to the FDA at the time
of first use. 27 Additionally, the FDA engages in regular, but limited, surveillance to
assess compliance with its promotional standards for prescription drugs and
pursues enforcement actions as necessary.28 Despite the FDA's broad authority and
genuine efforts to control the promotion and advertising of prescription drugs, and
although many pharmaceutical companies act with the best of intentions, by design,
mistake, employment of unscrupulous sales representatives, or other means,
companies continue to push the outer limits of the law with regard to promotional
29

activities.

Until fairly recently, the FDA exercised almost exclusive regulatory and
enforcement authority over pharmaceutical companies' promotional activities

24. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (k)-(1) (describing the large range of regulated advertisements under the
FD&C Act); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TOCONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 17, 24 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03177.pdf (explaining the efficiency and promotion of industry self regulation) (redesignating the
General Accounting Office as the Governmental Accountability Office occurred under the GAO Human
Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, §§ 1(a), 8(a), 118 Stat. 811, 811, 814 (2004)).
25. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (describing advertisement parameters for prescription drugs in
detail); DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS
1
(1999),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucm125064.pdf; Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., Guidance, Compliance, & Regulatory Information, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/default.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (providing links to
numerous regulatory reports, initiatives and activities available to manufacturers and providers).
26. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500, .510, .550 (describing how pre-approval of promotional materials is
required for drugs approved under FDA's accelerated approval process).
27. Id. § 314.81(b)(3)(i) (requiring companies to report promotional materials at the time of "initial
dissemination" and "initial publication").
28. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA'S OVERSIGHT OF THE
PROMOTION OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES 13-15 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08835.pdf. The transmittal form is used by FDA as a source of information as to what
companies are disseminating and publishing. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supranote 11.
29. Some of the more recent willingness to stretch the FDA's promotional boundaries may be
traced to companies' growing confidence in their right to disseminate truthful off-label information
under the First Amendment following Washington Legal Foundation's successful challenge to the
constitutionality of FDA restrictions on speech regarding off-label uses of the FDA-approved products.
See Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66, 74 (D.D.C. 1998).
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related to prescription drugs.3 ° Under the FD&C Act, the FDA has a variety of
methods to control unlawful promotion, including administrative, 31 civil,32 and
criminal penalties 33 for unlawful promotion. Despite the variety of methods
available, the FDA's use of punitive sanctions has been rare.34 Rather, the FDA
typically attempts to achieve compliance from companies through less formal
means, often relying on "untitled" 35 or warning letters to register its objection to
promotional activities and provide companies with opportunities to cure misleading
messages about the safe and effective use of a product.36 The agency's enforcement
approach has not been perceived as completely successful in stopping or preventing
unlawful marketing practices.37 Critics argue that companies operate on the premise

30. See Thompson Med. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 791 F.2d 189, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539 (Sept. 16, 1971).
31. See 21 C.F.R § 7.40(a) (allowing the FDA to issue a recall on drugs that "are in violation of
laws administered by the Food and Drug Administration," like the FD&C Act).
32. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (2006) (civil punishment of injunction); 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(0(1)
(West Supp. 2008) (civil monetary penalties for misbranding); id. § 333(g) (civil penalties for false and
misleading direct-to-consumer ads); id. § 334(a)(1) (seizure).
33. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (misdemeanor and felony criminal provisions).
34. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 24, at 26 (stating that DDMAC officials did
not refer any violations to the Department of Justice for enforcement between 2003 and 2007).
35. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., supranote 22, at 53.
Untitled letters address promotion violations that are less serious than those addressed in
warning letters. A reviewer's untitled letter is peer-reviewed and has the concurrence of the
branch chief In such letters, DDMAC usually requests that a company take specific action to
bring the company into compliance within a certain amount of time, usually 10 working
days. There is no requirement that the agency take enforcement action, although the letters
may serve as a basis for additional regulatory action.
Id.
36. Warning letters are reserved for activity FDA perceives as raising more serious health concerns
and require that companies take corrective action. See id. at 53-54; OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
supra note 10, at 4-1 to - 18. Warning Letters often include sending Dear Doctor letters to physicians the
company has provided with questionable promotional materials in order to correct false or misleading
messages about a particular product. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas W. Abrams, Dir., Div. of Drug
Mktg., Adver., and Commc'ns, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Brian A. Markison, Chairman, President,
& Chief Executive Officer, King Pharmaceuticals (March 24, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ICECl/EnforcementActionsWarmingLetters/2008/ucmlO48362.htm; Letter from Lisa M. Hubbard,
Regulatory Review Officer, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Dennis Ahem, Assoc. Dir. of Regulatory
Affairs, Shire Dev., Inc. (May 1, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WamingLettersandNoticeof
ViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm054102.pdf.
37. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 24, at 4 (recognizing that despite FDA
oversight some pharmaceutical companies "repeatedly disseminat[ed] new misleading advertisements);
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION

DRUGS: TRENDS IN FDA'S OVERSIGHT

OF

1, 13 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d08758t.pdf; Jonathan H. Marks, The Price of Seduction: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs in the U.S., 64 N.C. MED. J. 292, 292-94 (2003) ("The [GAO Study] makes clear
that although regulatory letters halt the dissemination of misleading advertisements, they do not deter
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER

ADVERTISING
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that the benefits of questionable promotional tactics outweigh the risk that the FDA
will take action or that the consequences of any action will be significant.38 In part,
that perception and critique are probably fueled by the FDA's overall approach to
unlawful promotional activity, which has traditionally addressed claims on an
individual basis, focusing on specific pieces of labeling, advertisements, or
activities, rather than considering the overall context and collective impact of
39
claims made as part of companies' broader marketing schemes.
The FDA's enforcement restraint has undoubtedly contributed to the
emergence of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as a more strident crusader
against FD&C Act violations arising from the promotion of off-label uses. Looking
beyond the FDA's traditionally narrow emphasis on individual claims and
activities, the DOJ asserts that when viewed collectively, individual promotional
claims and activities may support broader charges that a pharmaceutical company
is engaged in a scheme of fraudulent marketing.4 ° In 1999, for example, the DOJ
brought its first ever criminal prosecution against a drug company (Genentech,
Inc.) for violating FDA rules against promoting a drug for unapproved uses.4'
Faced with the DOJ's allegation that discernible "patterns" of off-label promotion
amounted to a misbranding scheme, Genentech paid $50 million to settle charges
that it illegally promoted its approved drug Protropin (human growth hormone) for
unapproved uses related to the treatment of children who were undersized for
reasons other than the lack of adequate growth hormone, the treatment children
with a rare form of juvenile obesity, and the treatment of burn patients. 42 More
recently, the DOJ's continued focus on the overall impact of promotional
marketing schemes rather than on individual labeling and advertising claims was
exemplified by its 2004 settlement with Warner-Lambert following the decision in
United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis.43 The DOJ based its charges against

pharmaceutical companies from making misleading claims in subsequent advertisements, even those for
the same drug.").
38. See Marks, supra note 37, at 293-94.
39. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 5 ("[T]he extent and variety of
promotional activities that occur make it difficult for [the] FDA to oversee them in a comprehensive
manner.") (emphasis added). The Government Accountability Office's recent report provides a detailed
discussion of FDA's oversight approach and its shortcomings regarding off-label promotional activity.
Id. at 13-16.
40. See id. at 24 tbl.3, 26-27 (contrasting the FDA's narrow regulatory letters with the DOJ
settlements and actions based on alleged marketing schemes).
41. Tamar Nordenberg, Maker of Growth Hormone Feels Long Arm of Law, FDA CONSUMER,
Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 33.
42. Id.
43. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve
Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04-civ-322.htm. The settlement followed the District Court of
Massachusetts' denial of Parke-Davis' motion for summary judgment, allowing allegations of False
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Warner-Lambert on the company's off-label promotion for its drug, Neurontin,
including activities related to sales representatives, medical liaisons, paid
consultants' meetings and advisory boards, and teleconferences. 4 As part of its
guilty plea, Warner-Lambert agreed to pay a $240 million criminal fine for
violating the FD&C Act and an additional $190 million to settle civil liabilities
under the False Claims Act.45
The DOJ's increased enforcement role and interest in pursuing violations of
the FD&C Act have precipitated several major changes in its approach to unlawful
promotion by pharmaceutical companies. First, the DOJ's focus on punishing broad
marketing schemes and strategies has resulted in an overall expansion in
enforcement and penalties against companies that engage in unlawful promotion,
encompassing more aggressive application of the criminal misbranding and felony
intent provisions of the FD&C Act.46 Second, the DOJ has extended its
prosecutorial reach over unlawful promotion by applying the False Claims Act to
violations of the FD&C Act under the theory that pharmaceutical companies, by
promoting their products for off-label uses, cause the filing of false requests for
reimbursement with Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health care programs. 47
Third, by negotiating settlements under the FD&C Act and the False Claims Act,
the DOJ has avoided judicial review of its enforcement theories and procedures,
increasing the likelihood that its significantly altered approach to unlawful drug
promotion will continue unchecked. 4
For the reasons described below, this Article criticizes the manner in which
the DOJ has expanded its application of the False Claims Act and broadened the
remedies available to punish pharmaceutical companies whose advertising and
promotional labeling activities violate the FD&C Act. By shifting the focus from
correction and compliance to punishment, the DOJ has stumbled upon not just one
goose but an entire flock of geese, each of which is capable of laying the proverbial
golden egg at the government's doorstep. 49 Indeed, within the last five years, the
DOJ negotiated criminal and civil settlements with individual pharmaceutical
companies, ranging in dollar amounts from just under ten million to more than a

Claims Act violations to proceed to trial. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. 96-1165 1PBS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *1, *20. (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003).
44. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 43.
45. Id.
46. See infra Part I1.
47. Parke-Davis,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *1, *4-5, * 10-15; see infra Part II.A.
48. See infra Part III.D.
49. The attraction may be impossible to resist as nobody much cares for these geese who are
already maligned from every direction as dirty, dishonest, price-gouging crooks. See, e.g., Scott
Gottlieb, Stop the War on Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2007, at A21 ("Drug firms are persona non grata
in Washington, a result of the industry's own excesses, but also of a lot of political targeting. The result
is an anything-that-bashes-pharma goes mentality in policy making.").

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 12:119

billion. 50 In the face of such profound financial success, there has been little
incentive for the government to question either the legality or wisdom of its
approach. Nor are companies willing to litigate against the DOJ because of the
potential costs associated with the exclusion remedy administered by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 5 1 under which the HHS may
exclude a company's products from federal health care reimbursement programs.
There are genuine concerns raised by the DOJ's focus on punishment, its
application of the False Claims Act to unlawful promotion cases, and its readiness
to negotiate settlements that stretch remedies available under the False Claims Act
and the FD&C Act.
First, to the extent that the DOJ's enforcement approach to unlawful
promotion reaps large monetary recoveries, the DOJ is likely to continue focusing
on the rewards of punishment without regard to the benefits associated with the
FDA's more traditional aims of correction and compliance. Such a shift is
problematic in the context of pharmaceutical labeling and advertising, where the
FDA's long-standing reliance on industry self-regulation (with Agency guidance)
legitimately serves the public health and is consistent with the goals of the FD&C
Act and the amount of enforcement resources available. The DOJ should consider
the benefits of the FDA's enforcement approach and its expertise in issues related

50. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 26-27; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History: Pfizer to
Pay $2.3 Billion for Fraudulent Marketing (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www justice.gov/
opa/pr/2009/September/09-civ-900.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company
Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (January 15,
2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html; Press Release, U.S.
Attorney's Office E. Dist. of N.Y., Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Agrees to Pay $20 Million to Resolve
Criminal and Civil Allegations in "Off-Label" Marketing Investigation (July 13, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2007/2007jull3a.html; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office W.
Dist. of Va., The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc. and Top Executives Plead Guilty to Misbranding
OxyContin; Will Pay over $600 Million (May 10, 2007).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006) (describing the statutory authority of the Department of Health
and Human Services to exclude individuals and companies from the Medicare and State health care
programs); Ronald H. Clark et al., HHS Expanded Use of Fraud Law's "CorporateDeath Sentence" Is
Legally Suspect, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, June 6, 2003, at 1-3, availableat http://www.arentfox.com/
pdf notReady/content I11 7.pdf.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) often negotiates compliance obligations with health
care providers and other entities as part of the settlement of Federal health care program
investigations arising under a variety of civil false claims statutes. A provider or entity
consents to these obligations as part of the civil settlement and in exchange for the OIG's
agreement not to seek an exclusion of that health care provider or entity from participation in
Medicare, Medicaid and other Federal health care programs. False claims submitted in
violation of the False Claims Act or Civil Monetary Penalties Law give rise to the OIG's
permissive exclusion authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (2000). Providers who settle
these cases often deny that they were liable or that they committed the alleged conduct.
Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Corporate Integrity Agreements,
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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to public health, and ensure that the FDA's role in assessing the legitimacy of
promotional claims under the FD&C Act is not too diminished.
Second, applying the False Claims Act to unlawful promotion cases raises
significant legal questions. The DOJ's position that unlawful promotional activity
by pharmaceutical companies "induces" physicians to write prescriptions, resulting
in the filing of false claims for reimbursement 52 relies on a questionable theory of
causation. Given that the penalty provisions in the FD&C Act, in conjunction with
the doctrine of equitable disgorgement,53 provide sufficient means to punish
unlawful promotional activity, reliance on the questionable theory of causation
required to prosecute cases under the False Claims Act is unnecessary. Instead of
using the False Claims Act, the DOJ should address unlawful promotional activity
solely under the FD&C Act, which is the statutory scheme established by Congress
specifically for that purpose and provides adequate remedies and punishment.
Third, even if the shift from compliance to punishment is warranted, and even
if the use of the False Claims Act against unlawful promotional claims is
legitimate, the DOJ's enforcement approach under both the False Claims Act and
the FD&C Act has culminated in negotiated settlements with individual
companies. 5 4 The amounts of these settlements are large, 55 suggesting an expansion
of remedies that deserves a closer look. Having, for the most part, avoided judicial
scrutiny of its enforcement activity in the area of unlawful promotion of approved
drugs,56 it is unclear whether the significant legal and policy decisions related to the
DOJ's interpretation and application of the FD&C Act and False Claims Act are
valid. Thus, at the very least, if the government is going to continue to employ the
False Claims Act in these types of cases, it must exercise its discretion carefully
and resist the temptation to extract inappropriate and unsubstantiated monetary
settlements. When relying on the FD&C Act to punish unlawful promotion by
pharmaceutical companies, similar restraint should be exercised.
Under neither scenario should the DOJ negotiate large monetary settlements
based on threats related to loss of government business. Ultimately, by creating an
environment that encourages companies to settle unlawful promotional claims at
any cost, the DOJ's "recovery" of what it views as companies' "ill-gotten gains"

52. Parke-Davis,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *15-17; Ralph F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When
You Have a Hammer Everything Looks like a Nail: Misapplicationof the False Claims Act to Off-Label
Promotion, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 658 (2006).
53. Disgorgement in this context refers to the courts' traditional equitable authority to order
restitution for reimbursement and deterrent purposes and has been found within the scope of remedies
allowed under the FD&C Act. See, e.g., United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1053-54, 106162 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 220, 222, 225 (3d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 754, 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1999).
54. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 26-27.
55. See sources cited supra note 50.
56. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 28 tbl.4 (listing several large
settlements over the past four years); see infra Part III.D.
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may enrich the United States Treasury at the expense of consumers from whom
such costs will be extracted.
I.

RESTRICTIONS ON DRUG PROMOTION UNDER THE FD&C ACT

As a prerequisite to the lawful promotion of a prescription drug, the drug
must be legally on the market pursuant to an approved new drug application
(NDA).57 The success of an NDA depends, in part, on the drug sponsor's ability to
prove that the drug is "safe and effective for its intended use(s). 58 The intended
use of an approved drug is carefully restricted and must be properly reflected in the
labeling that accompanies the drug, which is also subject to FDA approval.59
Together, these approval mechanisms ensure that drugs are approved only for those
uses for which safety and effectiveness have been established, and that approved
drugs will be properly understood and used by the physicians who prescribe them.
A prescription drug with an approved NDA offers a pharmaceutical company
a wide variety of promotional options. Promotion may be directed toward health
care professionals (including physicians and pharmacy benefit managers),
consumers, or both.6 ° While the majority of promotional labeling and advertising
efforts fall within the regulatory parameters set by the FDA, not all pharmaceutical
companies are able to resist the temptation to increase sales through unlawful
promotional activities. When pharmaceutical companies cross the line from lawful
to unlawful promotion, two potential charges commonly arise under the FD&C
Act: that the company introduced a new drug into interstate commerce, 6' or that the
company misbranded a drug.62

57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) is
effective with respect to such drug."). The limited exceptions to the approved NDA route to market are
not reviewed here, as they do not impact the application of the promotion and advertising restrictions
imposed on prescription drugs.
58. Id. § 355(b)(1)(A) (requiring submission of full reports of investigations that have been made
on the safety and effectiveness of the drug as part of the NDA); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(i) (2008)
(describing the proposed text of labeling that must be submitted as part of the application to market a
new drug).
59. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(l)(F) (requiring submission of labeling specimens for the drug as part
of the NDA); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(c)(2), 601.2(a). "For prescription products, the FDA-approved
labeling must be included in or within the package from which the drug or device is to be dispensed, or
else the product is deemed misbranded on the ground that it lacks adequate directions for use." U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., supra note 11,at 2-3; see also 21 U.S.C. § 352(0(1); 21
C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(l).
60. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 24, at 9.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 331(d) (prohibiting the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of a "new drug" as defined under section 355 of the FD&C Act). The prohibition applies to
biologics, 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006), and any reference to drugs in this Article also includes biological
products.
62. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (prohibiting the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of any drug that is misbranded); id. § 352(a) (defining a drug as misbranded if its labeling is
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A. Creatinga "New Drug" Through "Off-Label" Promotion
The FD&C Act limits drugs sold in the United States to those that are proven
to be "safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling., 63 Because approved applications for drugs identify the
specific uses for which a drug may be marketed,64 promoting an approved drug for
an unapproved use (i.e., for an "off-label" use) renders the drug "new" under the
FD&C Act. 65 Whether the expanded claims for use are truthful representations of
the drug's efficacy is irrelevant, as such claims must still be approved by the FDA
before the drug can be promoted for an unapproved purpose. 66 When a
pharmaceutical company promotes an approved drug for a use that is not
specifically identified in the drug's approved NDA, the FDA may charge the
company with unlawfully introducing a new drug into interstate commerce under
the FD&C Act.67
While off-label promotion of lawfully marketed drugs is generally prohibited
under the FD&C Act, not all communications about off-label uses of approved
drugs are banned. Scientists, physicians, consumers, and other entities or
individuals unrelated to the company or to the marketing of a product generally are
free to consider and discuss off-label uses of approved drugs.68 Permitting such
entities to engage in dialogue about off-label uses is critical to the public health. In
2005, the National Comprehensive Cancer Network estimated that fifty to seventyfive percent of all uses of drugs and biologics in cancer care in the United States
were off-label. 69 Allowing some exchange of scientific and educational information
is consistent with physicians' prescribing authority. 70 Regardless of whether the
false or misleading); id. § 352(0(1) (defining a drug as misbranded where its labeling lacks adequate
directions for use).
63. Id. § 3 2 1(p)(1).
64. Id. § 355(b)(1).
65. Id. § 321(p).
66. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (2008) (prohibiting the recommendation of a use that is not
covered by the labeling in the approved new-drug application).
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(d); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(4)(i)(a).
68. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128. Claims made in these contexts are not regulated by FDA because they
fall outside the scope of the "intended use" of a drug, which refers to the objective intent of the persons
legally responsible for the labeling of the product as suggested by the circumstances surrounding its
distribution and marketing. Id.
69. Michael Soares, "Off-Label" Indications for Oncology Drug Use and Drug Compendia:
History and CurrentStatus, J. ONCOLOGY PRAC., Sept. 2005, at 102-04. Off-label uses are even more
prevalent in the pediatric population. Id. at 104.
70. This professional discretion is granted to physicians under the "practice of medicine" exception
to FDA's drug approval process, which permits the off-label use of approved drugs. See James M. Beck
& Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and
Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 76-80 (1998); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., "Off-Label" and
Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices (1998), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/GuidanceslnfonrmationSheets
andNotices/ucmI 16355.htm.
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FDA has approved a particular use for a drug, if the drug is legally on the market a
physician may prescribe it for any safe and effective use that will benefit a
patient. 71 Thus, the opportunity to increase sales by marketing off-label uses to
physicians provides much of the impetus for unlawful promotion that may result in
a "new drug" charge against a pharmaceutical company.72
Beyond the dialogue between disinterested entities, the public health value of
exchanging off-label information is so critical that even companies and others who
are responsible for marketing an approved drug are granted some ability to
communicate about off-label uses without violating the FD&C Act. 7 3 Under those
circumstances, the value of exchanging off-label information is balanced against
the risk of unlawful promotion by carefully circumscribing the conditions under
which the information is delivered to ensure that such information is scientifically
valid and not presented in a promotional manner.74 Thus, the limited exceptions to

Good medical practice and the best interests of the patient require that physicians use legally
available drugs, biologics and devices according to their best knowledge and judgement [sic].
If physicians use a product for an indication not in the approved labeling, they have the
responsibility to be well informed about the product, to base its use on firm scientific
rationale and on sound medical evidence, and to maintain records of the product's use and
effects. Use of a marketed product in this manner when the intent is the "practice of
medicine" does not require the submission of an Investigational New Drug Application
(IND), Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) or review by an Institutional Review Board
(IRB).
Id. (emphasis in original).
71. See Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label
Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 976-77 (2007); U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., supra note 70.
72. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US AND

WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 137 (2004); see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 21
fig.2 (detailing that 50% of off-label promotion was directed at medical professionals alone while 33%
at both medical professionals and consumers).
73. See 21 C.F.R. § 99.101; Draft Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the
Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on
Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg.
9342 (Feb. 20, 2008); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR

CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 2-5 (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/98fr/fda-2008d-0053-gdl.pdf.
74. There are a number of methods by which a company, its employees, or its agents may
disseminate information about off-label uses of an approved drug. See 21 C.F.R. § 99.101. The
exchange of scientific information in a non-promotional context is permitted by regulation. Id. §
312.7(a). FDA also sanctions discussions about off-label uses in the context of industry-supported
scientific and educational activities that are otherwise independent and non-promotional as where, for
example, a company provides financial support for independent Continuing Medical Education
activities. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 73, at 2-6. An informal policy of allowing
companies to respond to unsolicited requests from healthcare personnel for information about off-label
uses also exists. Id. Under very limited circumstances, companies may also disseminate peer-reviewed
journal articles and medical texts that include references to off-label uses of approved drugs. See Draft
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the rules against off-label dissemination of information recognize that dialogue is
vital to the continued development and improvement of pharmaceutical options for
controlling and preventing disease.
B.

75

Promotion that "Misbrands" a Drug

The types of unlawful promotion that may result in new drug charges under
the FD&C Act are often combined with the FD&C Act's misbranding prohibitions.
When a pharmaceutical company labels a drug in a way that is false or
misleading, 76 advertises a drug in a way that fails to meet the requirements for a
true statement of information set forth in the FD&C Act, 77 or suggests uses for a
drug for which no adequate directions are provided,78 the company may face
misbranding charges. Generally speaking, the parameters for promotional labeling
and advertising of a prescription drug are dictated by the labeling approved by the
FDA in conjunction with the drug's NDA. 79 A manufacturer may promote only
those claims relating to the intended uses for which the drug has been approved
(i.e., "on-label" uses). 80 Promotional claims relating to on-label uses violate the
81
FD&C Act prohibitions on misbranding when they are "false or misleading."
Among the types of claims commonly meeting those criteria are claims that a drug
is safer or more effective than the substantial evidence submitted to the FDA for
approval of the drug supports.82 In addition to affirmative statements that are false
Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and
Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and
Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. at 9342; see also Washington Legal Found. v.
Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing dissemination of truthful off-label information as
protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution). The statutory authority
for these informal FDA policies that existed under sections 551 and 552 of the Food and Drug
Modernization Act of 1997 expired pursuant to sunset provisions in September 2006. Food and Drug
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, §§ 551-52, 557(e), I1I Stat. 2296, 2356-59, 2364.
75. While there are many other ways to misbrand a product, methods that are not related to the
promotional labeling or advertising for a product are not included in this discussion.
76. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006).
77. Id. § 352(n), amended by Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 940, 942 (2007).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 352(0.
79. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)-(b), (e) (2008).
80. See id. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a).
81. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) ("A drug shall be deemed misbranded if its labeling is false or misleading in
any particular."). The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) amended the
misbranding provisions of section 352 to provide that a violation of the new safety labeling requirements
in section 355 also results in the misbranding of the drug product. Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 § 902(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(z) (West Supp. 2008).
82. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(i). Claims of this type, which are made in the context of the
approved uses for a drug, violate FDA's requirement that advertisements include a "true statement" of
information. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n). Such claims may also arise in the context of comparative claims,
i.e. where greater efficacy or safety than another approved drug is alleged without substantial evidence
to support such claim. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(ii).
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or misleading, misbranding also encompasses what a company fails to say about its
product.83 For example, a manufacturer may misbrand its product by presenting
information about safety and efficacy without corresponding information about side
effects and contraindications.84 Indeed, the vast majority of violations identified by
the FDA in letters to pharmaceutical companies stem from inadequate presentation
(i.e., omission or minimization) of risk information.85
Misbranding of an approved drug may also occur when an approved drug is
promoted for off-label uses.86 Under those circumstances, the drug is not only a
"new drug" but is also misbranded because no FDA-approved labeling for the new
use exists and thus the labeling cannot bear adequate directions for use 87 as
required. The FDA often couples misbranding charges with "new drug" charges
when it asserts regulatory authority over unlawful promotion of a prescription
drug. 88
II.

ENFORCEMENT APPROACHES TO

FD&C

ACT VIOLATIONS

Whether a company is making an on-label or off-label claim for an approved
drug, it faces potential prosecution for unlawful promotion if the FDA believes the
claim violates the misbranding or new drug provisions of the FD&C Act.
Enforcement options currently available include those provided by the FD&C Act
and the False Claims Act. The FD&C Act enforcement options range from purely
administrative remedies to the use of seizure, injunction, and civil and criminal
penalties. 89 The FDA may act independently with regard to FD&C Act
administrative options, which in the context of promotional violations are generally
limited to the use of informal (i.e., "untitled") 90 and formal (i.e., "warning")

83. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n).
[I]n determining whether the labeling or advertising is misleading there shall be taken into
account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word,
design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the labeling or
advertising fails to reveal facts with respect to consequences which may result from the use
of the article ....
Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. The absence of a true statement of information corresponds to the manufacturer's failure to
present information that is fairly balanced. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(ii).
85. See Thomas Abrams, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Update on Advertising and Promotion
of Prescription Drugs 8 (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
CDER/ucm095984.ppt.
86. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a).
87. 21 U.S.C. § 352(0.
88. See, e.g., id. § 331(a), (d) (prohibiting interstate sale of misbranded drugs and unapproved new
drugs in the same section).
89. See sources cited supra notes 32-33.
90. OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 4-25 to -26. "An Untitled Letter cites
violations that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance for a Warning Letter." Id. at 4-25.
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letters. 91 These letters notify manufacturers of materials that the FDA considers to
be unlawful and may request or require specific corrective action to disseminate
accurate and complete information to any audience that received a misleading
message.92 Where the FDA seeks more than an administrative remedy, the agency
must refer the case to the DOJs Office of Consumer Litigation (OCL) (although
DOJ may initiate a case under the FD&C Act without a referral from FDA).93 The
FD&C Act referral process varies, depending on the nature of the case, but often
includes multiple state and federal government agencies and offices.94
When the False Claims Act is the vehicle for prosecuting pharmaceutical
promotion violations, the enforcement option is civil fraud penalties. 95 As with the
FD&C Act, the DOJ also has direct authority over False Claims Act litigation,
which allows DOJ to initiate a False Claims Act prosecution on its own and also
provides an avenue for the FDA to bring such cases.96 Typically, however, False
Claims Act litigation is initiated by private citizens acting on behalf of the
government through the filing of a qui tam suit,97 bypassing the FDA.
Among the incentives for private parties to expose fraud against the
government is the False Claims Act provision that awards qui tam plaintiffs a

91. Id. at 4-1 to -3.
92. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas W. Abrams to Brian A. Markison, supra note 36; Letter from
Lisa M. Hubbard to Dennis Ahem, supra note 36.
93. The Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the Department of Justice must
approve any criminal prosecution and any civil penalty or injunctive proceeding brought under the
FD&C Act. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.450) (2008). The Department of Justice sends civil and criminal cases to
the Office of Consumer Litigation "pursuant to longstanding DOJ policy." See Office of Consumer
Litig., The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/ocl/monograph/
fdca.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
94. Office of Consumer Litig., supra note 93; see, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Medicis
Pharmaceutical to Pay U.S. $9.8 Million to Resolve False Claims Allegations (May 8, 2007), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/May/07_civ_336.html (stating that the FDA's Office of Criminal
Investigations and the Kansas Attorney General's Office investigated the case); Press Release, Michael
J. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney Dist. of Mass., Schering to Pay $435 Million for the Improper Marketing of
Drugs and Medicaid Fraud (Aug. 29, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ma[Press%20
Office%20-%20Press%2ORelease%2OFiles/Schering-Plough/press%20release.pdf
(stating that the
investigation was conducted by FDA's Regional Office of Criminal Investigations, HHS's OIG, The
Department of Defense's Criminal Investigation Services, and the U.S. Office of Veterans Affairs, and
that the New York and Washington State Attorneys General also assisted in the investigation).
95. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a) (West Supp. 2008).
96. 28 C.F.R. § 0.45(d).
97. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, More than $1 Billion Recovered by Justice Department in
Fraud and False Claims in Fiscal Year 2008 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2008/November/08-civ-992,html (stating that almost 78% of False Claims Act recoveries in 2008
were "associated with suits initiated by private citizens ... under the False Claims Act's qui tam
provisions"). Qui tam is a short version of the full Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur, which translates as "who as well for the king as for himself sues in this
matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
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percentage of any successful prosecution or settlement. 98 Use of the False Claims
Act to combat fraud against the government dates back to the Civil War, when the
statute was used primarily in the context of supply contracts connected to the
government's war efforts. 99 In modern times, expansion of the False Claims Act to
address health care fraud has encompassed a variety of unlawful activities ranging
from billing for services never rendered to reimbursement issues based on drug
company practices regarding Average Wholesale Prices. 00 The use of the False
Claims Act to punish unlawful promotion under the FD&C Act is the most recent
attempt to use the False Claims Act as a regulatory tool against pharmaceutical
companies. Although False Claims Act complaints against unlawful promotion are
rooted in FD&C Act violations, for which adequate enforcement provisions already
exist,' 0' the potential for greater civil fines under the False Claims Act and its
attraction of qui tam plaintiffs are among the features that distinguish the False
Claims Act from enforcement under the FD&C Act and likely account for much of
its appeal to government prosecutors.
In addition to the enforcement options provided under the FD&C Act and
False Claims Act, fraudulent scheme theories punished under either of these Acts
also raise the specter of exclusion from participation in federal health care
programs pursuant to the Social Security Act.'0 2 Under the exclusionary regime
administered by the HHS's Office of the Inspector General, an individual or entity
convicted of a felony related to health care fraud (or for other enumerated crimes)
is prohibited from participating in federal health care programs (mandatory
exclusion) for a minimum of five years.'0 3 Permissive exclusion may be imposed
for various other prohibited activities, including conviction of a misdemeanor
related to health care fraud, which carries a minimum exclusionary period of three
years.l°4 The threat of exclusion from Medicare, Medicaid, and all other health care

98, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006).
99. Edward P. Lansdale, Note, Used as Directed? How Prosecutors Are Expanding the False
Claims Act to Police PharmaceuticalOff-Label Marketing, 41 NEW ENG. L. REv. 159, 168 (2006). For a
detailed history of the False Claims Act and its evolution in the health care context, see id. at 168-71.
100. Id. at 177.
101. See sources cited supra note 32-33.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(3) (2006). Also included within the Social Security Act and
sometimes associated with prosecutions for unlawful promotion are sections II 28A (the Civil Monetary
Penalties Law), id. § 1320a-7a, and 1128B (the Anti-Kickback Statute), id § 1320a-7b. This Article does
not address the use of those sections in the context of unlawful promotion cases. For a detailed
discussion of the interplay between the Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act, see Lisa
Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discreditingthe Use of Alleged Anti-Kickback
Violations to Support Civil False Claim Actions, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1003, 1017-22 (1998).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(3); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(a) (2008) (detailing the five-year time limit
for mandatory exclusions).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(l)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(a)-(b)(1). Detailed requirements related to
the imposition of permissive exclusion are set forth in implementing regulations. See 42 C.F.R. §§
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programs is serious and has been characterized as a corporate "death sentence" for
pharmaceutical companies. 0 5 Indeed, the risk of losing millions of customers
covered under these programs explains many companies' willingness to settle
rather than litigate issues related to off-label promotion. 106 Thus, the threat of
exclusion is a powerful enforcement option for punishing unlawful promotion.
Unlawful promotion that negatively impacts the public health should be
punished, but not necessarily through the creative enforcement options currently
employed by the DOJ. Because there is a long history of punishing pharmaceutical
companies for the unlawful promotion of drugs under the FD&C Act, the
procedures, application, and understanding of the impact associated with those
enforcement options are well-established. In contrast, the DOJ's efforts to employ
the False Claims Act and to incorporate the threat of exclusion from federal
programs against pharmaceutical companies for unlawful promotion are less than a
decade old.107 To date, most scholars commenting on the use of the False Claims
Act against companies that unlawfully promote their approved prescription drugs
have focused primarily on prosecution of truthful, off-label promotion. 10 8 Applying
the False Claims Act to prosecute truthful claims about a drug has been criticized
as raising free speech issues under the First Amendment,' 0 9 but of greater concern
is DOJ's current enforcement approach generally and whether the False Claims Act
0
is an appropriate enforcement vehicle under any circumstance." 1

1001.201-.951; see also Criteria for Implementing Permissive Exclusion Authority Under Section
1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,392 (Dec. 24, 1997).
105. Christopher D. Zalesky, PharmaceuticalMarketing Practices: Balancing Public Health and
Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation,39 J. HEALTH L. 235, 241
& n.27 (2006).
106. Id.; see also Robert Ullmann, Unhealthy Justice, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, May 2005, at
194. Mr. Ullmann describes the DOJ as beating large settlement payments from companies under threat
of exclusion, basing his view on the creative efforts by DOJ to avoid application of the government's
exclusion authority. Id. For example, Mr. Ullmann notes that the guilty plea for Warner-Lambert's
promotion of Neurontin was for activity "through at least August 20, 1996"-one day prior to the
August 21, 1996 effective date of the exclusion statute. Id.; Gardiner Harris, Pfizer to Pay $430 Million
over PromotingDrug to Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2004, at Cl.
107. See Hall & Berlin, supranote 52, at 661-63.
108. See, e.g., Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of
PharmaceuticalProducts, 110 PENN. ST. L. REv. 41, 48-50 (2005); Hall & Berlin, supra note 52, at 1;
but see Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatizationof Public Enforcement:
The Case of PharmaceuticalFraud,40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 320-25 (2007).
109. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84, 87 (D.D.C. 1999). The focus on
truthful off-label promotion in this context is similar to the Washington Legal Foundation's litigation
efforts to prevent FDA from prohibiting the dissemination of truthful information on the grounds that it
violates the right to free speech under the First Amendment. See id.
110. See Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REv. 121, 201-06 (2001). Concerns about the
application of the False Claims Act to the health care industry are not new; Professor Joan Krause
provides a detailed analysis of the fiscal harm associated with damages imposed under the False Claims
Act and criticizes the lack of judicial guidance associated with negotiated settlement agreements. Id.
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Using the False Claims Act to Punish Unlawful Drug Promotion

The DOJ's recent prosecution of Medicis Pharmaceutical Company (Medicis)
under the False Claims Act illustrates use of the Act to enforce FD&C Act
violations related to unlawful promotion. Medicis manufactures Loprox, a topical
anti-fungal approved by the FDA as a prescription drug to treat certain skin
infections in humans over the age of ten.11' The professional package insert for
Loprox indicates that individuals using the drug should avoid covering the
treatment area with air-tight wrappings or dressings." 2 In 2001, despite the age and
use restrictions specified by the FDA as part of Loprox's approval, Medicis began
aggressively marketing Loprox to pediatricians, training its sales force to solicit,
market, and promote Loprox for the off-label use of diaper rash (and various other
3
skin related infections) in patients under the age of ten." 1
According to sales representatives employed by Medicis, in national and
regional meetings held through April 2004, Medicis trained its sales force to use
marketing brochures, graphics, photographs, and scripted sales pitches to
encourage pediatricians to prescribe Loprox for diaper rash and other skin
infections in babies and toddlers.' 14 In a complaint alleging violations of the False
Claims Act, four Medicis employees acting as qui tam plaintiffs (also called
relators) described examples of Medicis' management purposely misleading its
sales representatives and doctors in its attempt to gain a share of the pediatric
market." 5 Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that Medicis (1) instructed the
sales force on how to defuse and deflect objections from health care practitioners
about the off-label use of Loprox by making false and misleading statements about
data and studies on the safety and efficacy of using Loprox to treat infants; 1 6 (2)
provided a colorful marketing brochure on the off-label pediatric use of Loprox that
was designated "For presentation purposes only. Not to be left with physicians" for
use as a visual sales aid;"' (3) otherwise trained the sales force to refuse to leave

Many of the concerns she raised in 2001 regarding DOJ's use of the False Claims Act against billing and
other more traditional health care fraud practices apply to DOJ's expansion of the statute to unlawful
promotion of drugs by pharmaceutical companies. See discussion infra Part Ill.
I11. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 94.
112. First Amended Complaint at 8, United States ex rel. Mulqueen. v. Medicis Pharmaceutical

Corp., No. 04-02389-KHV-GR (D. Kan. Apr. 5, 2007).
113. Id. at 8-9. Prior to the Fall of 2001, Medicis' products were marketed primarily to
dermatologists, podiatrists, and general internists treating adults with dermatological conditions. Id. at 6.
This new marketing scheme coincided with Medicis' merger with Ascent Pediatrics, Inc., a company

focused on marketing pediatric pharmaceuticals. Id.
114. Id. at 17-18.
115. Id. at 4, 10-11. According to the Medicis employees, the company targeted pediatricians

because of the high percentage of Medicaid patients eligible for prescription drug reimbursement seen
by such doctors. Id. at 10.
116. Id. at 11, 19.
117. Id.at 17.
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any written marketing materials on the off-label use of Loprox with pediatricians to
avoid detection of their activities by the FDA;" 18 and (4) misrepresented to the sales
force that Loprox was FDA approved for pediatric use and that there was a
Japanese study supporting the successful use of Loprox for diaper rash. " 9
Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint against Medicis, the
company's off-label promotion of Loprox misbranded the drug under the FD&C
Act because it included false and misleading statements about the drug and made
claims about the use of Loprox for which no adequate (i.e., FDA approved)
directions existed.120 Medicis' promotional scheme for Loprox also violated the
new drug provisions of the FD&C Act by ascribing intended uses for the product
that were not part of its approved NDA.' 2' Although the government could have
prosecuted Medicis under the FD&C Act, the False Claims Act became the
enforcement vehicle when Medicis' sales representatives decided to file a qui tam
suit against the company.
As the plaintiffs did here, under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims
Act, private parties can file an action on behalf of the United States 22 and receive a
portion of any prosecution or settlement that the government achieves against the
defendants. 23 One of the advantages to the government of using the False Claims
Act is that the private plaintiffs do much of the critical preliminary work. As former
or current employees, they have access to information and experience that allows
them to identify internal company efforts to encourage unlawful promotion of a
prescription drug, providing key investigative information about how to establish
liability under the False Claims Act. The government then has the opportunity to
sort through the myriad cases filed by qui tam plaintiffs and select only the claims
most likely to succeed.
As required under the False Claims Act, the four Medicis plaintiffs served the
U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Kansas with a
complaint setting forth the alleged misconduct of their employer. 24 The complaint,
filed in August 2004, was kept under seal while the government investigated the
allegations. 125 False Claims Act complaints are kept under seal for at least sixty
days while the government decides whether to intervene and proceed with the
action or to decline, in which case the private plaintiffs may proceed on their

118. Id. at 20-21.
119. Id. at 19-20.
120. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(f), (n) (2006), amended by Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 940, 942 (2007).
121. Id.

122. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), (d) (2006) (describing the qui tam process).
123. Id. § 3730(d).

124. See id. § 3730(b)(2); First Amended Complaint, supra note 112, at 62.
125. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)-(4); First Amended Complaint, supra note 112, at 62.
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126

In fact, the investigation of a qui tam case usually takes much longer than
sixty days and courts are generally liberal in granting requests to keep claims under
seal beyond the required sixty days. 127 Not until March 2006 did the government
finalize its election to proceed with the case against Medicis and assume primary
responsibility for the prosecution, with the Medicis employees retaining the right to
28
continue as parties, subject to certain limitations.1
own.

Consistent with prior False Claims Act prosecutions for the unlawful
promotion of prescription drugs, the charges filed against Medicis were based on
the company's violations of the FD&C Act.' 29 There are two prevailing theories for
prosecuting FD&C Act violations under the False Claims Act. First, "any person"
is liable to the United States "who knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented... [to the government] ...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval."'' 30 Second, "any person who knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or
approved by the Government" is liable under the statute.' 3 1 In the most general
sense, the use of the False Claims Act against unlawful drug promotion by a
pharmaceutical company is premised on the DOJ's assumption that the drug
company's unlawful marketing is the but for cause of the physician's decision to
prescribe the drug and request federal health care program reimbursement. 132 That a

126. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(2)-(4).
127. See id. § 3730 (b)(3) (allowing a court to extend the time a complaint remains sealed for "good
cause shown"); Kimberly A. Lucia, United States v. Baylor University Medical Center: Impact of FRCP
15(c)(2) on the False Claims Act's Seal Provision, 42 U.C. DAVS L. REv. 255, 265 n.71, 276 n.163, 278
n. 186 (2008) (discussing courts routine nature in granting extensions and situations where an extension
was denied); Letter from Laurie E. Ekstrand, Dir., Homeland Sec. & Justice, Gov't Accountability
Office, to F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives 24,
30 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf (calculating the median time for
governmental False Claims Act investigations between 1987 and 2005 as 38 months).
128. Settlement Agreement Between the United States and Medicis (on file with author).
129. First Amended Complaint, supra note 112, at 4. The government's settlement with TAP
Pharmaceuticals was among the earliest intimations that the False Claims Act could be used to punish
unlawful promotional activity. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc.
and Seven Others Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to Settle
Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm.
130. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
131. Id. § 3729(a)(2). A third avenue of liability based on conspiracy is not addressed in this Article.
See id. § 3729(a)(3).
132. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163
(N.D. Ill.
2007) (asserting in action under the False Claims Act that "many doctor's would not have
prescribed Lovenox but for defendant's fraudulent statements"); United States ex rel. Hess v. SanofiSynthelabo Inc., No. 4:05CV570MLM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22449, at *23 (E.D. Mo. 2006)
(requiring a plaintiff to plead that "but for Defendant's allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations, the
doctors would not have made claims to Medicare for off-label uses" for a False Claims Act violation). In
general, Medicaid and Medicare reimburse pharmacies only for prescription drugs that are "covered
outpatient drugs." 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(10)(A) (2006). Drugs that are FDA approved meet that
definition, unless they are prescribed for an indication that is not "medically accepted." See id. § 1396r-
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company lacks any direct involvement in the actual preparation or submission of
the request for reimbursement under Medicaid or Medicare is irrelevant under the
DOJ's theory if there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to suggest that the
company acted in a way that induced the false claim(s) to be submitted.1 3 3 The
expansiveness of this view was acknowledged by a federal District Court in United
States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis. The Court nonetheless agreed with the basic
premise that Parke-Davis' unlawful promotion caused doctors to submit claims that
were not eligible for reimbursement by Medicaid: "Thus, the alleged [False Claims
Act] violation arises-not from unlawful off-label marketing activity itself-but
from the submission of Medicaid claims for uncovered off-label uses induced by
Defendant'sfraudulentconduct." 134
The causation and inducement theories acknowledged in Parke-Davis were
applied by the government in its case against Medicis. Working with the four
Medicis plaintiffs, the DOJ traced the marketing history for Loprox as it expanded
from its FDA-approved dermatological uses in patients over the age of ten to a
patient population that included babies and toddlers and focused on pediatric
practices. 135 According to the government:
Notwithstanding Medicis' knowledge that off-label prescriptions of
Loprox and Loprox TS were not medically accepted uses eligible for
Medicaid reimbursement, 136 Medicis knowingly and intentionally took
steps to increase the number of off-label Loprox and Loprox TS
prescriptions submitted to Medicaid. But for Medicis' promotion of offlabel uses, most of the ineligible claims for payment of Loprox and
Loprox TS prescriptions would never have been filed because they were
not in compliance
with Medicaid and other government statutes and
37
regulations.'
In the final settlement agreement with Medicis, the government reiterated that
because the company promoted uses of Loprox that were not "medically accepted
indications" under Medicaid, Medicis caused false and/or fraudulent claims to be
submitted to the government from November 2001 through April 2004.138 Under

8(k)(2)-(3). A medically accepted indication means any FDA approved use or use that is "supported by"
a citation in certain statutorily or agency recognized compendia. Id. § 1396r-8(k)(6).
133. See Greene, supra note 108, at 63; but see Hall & Berlin, supra note 52, at 665-70 (arguing that
the lack of direct involvement from manufacturers should prove fatal to False Claims Act claims).
134. 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52 (D. Mass. 2001) (emphasis added).
135. First Amended Complaint, supranote 112, at 6-9.
136. Drugs not used for a medically accepted use are not eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (k)(3).
137. First Amended Complaint, supranote 112, at 25.
138. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Medicaid Fraud Control Units, The National Association of
Medicaid Fraud Control Units Announces $9.8 Million Settlement with Medicis (Dec. 2007), available
at
http://www.namfcu.net/press/the-national-association-of-medicaid-fraud-control-units-namfcuannounces-9-8-million-settlement-with-medicis/.
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the False Claims Act, the penalty for each false claim submitted to the government
includes a civil fine of between $5,500 and $11,000 plus punitive damages up to
three times the amount of the false claim submitted to the government. 139 Denying
the allegations presented by the government but in the absence of any form of
adjudication under the FD&C Act by an Article III court, Medicis entered into a
civil settlement agreement under which it entered into a corporate integrity
agreement with the HHS's Office of Inspector General and paid $9.8 million to the
government, over one million of which was paid by the DOJ to the original qui tam
140
plaintiffs.
Similar uses of the False Claims Act in unlawful promotion cases have
enriched the government by substantially higher amounts, all without going to trial.
In 2005, Serono settled False Claims Act charges related to its off-label promotion
of the prescription drug Serostim for $567 million. 14 1 Intermune paid $36.9 million
under the False Claims Act in its 2006 settlement agreement for unlawful
promotion of the prescription drug Actimmune.142 Also in 2006, Schering paid
$255 million under the False Claims Act to settle charges of off-label promotion of
the prescription drugs Temodar and Intron A. 143 In combination with settlements
from other companies referenced above, since 2004 pharmaceutical companies
facing the threat of prosecution under the False Claims Act for unlawful promotion
have paid over $1 billion to avoid higher penalties
and the possibility of exclusion
44
from federal programs if found liable in court. 1

139. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(7) (2006). These civil fine amounts reflect the adjustments for
inflation made by regulation. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (2008).
140. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Medicaid Fraud Control Units, supra note 138; Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supranote 94.
141. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Serono to Pay $704 Million for the Illegal Marketing of
AIDS Drug (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05_civ_545.html
(attributing $567 million of the settlement amount to False Claims Act claims and $136.9 million to
violations of the FD&C Act).
142. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Biopharmaceutical Firm Intermune to Pay U.S. over $36
Million for Illegal Promotion and Marketing of Drug Actimmune (Oct. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_civ_728.html.
143. Press Release, Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney Dist. of Mass., supra note 94.
144. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 97 (accounting for more than $1 billion
collected from False Claims Act settlements with pharmaceutical companies for the fiscal year of 2008
alone). For more information on settlements paid by pharmaceutical companies, see Taxpayers Against
Fraud, FY 2007 False Claims Acts Settlements, http://www.taf.org/total2007.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2009); Taxpayers Against Fraud, FY 2006 False Claims Acts Settlements, http://www.taf.org/
total2006.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009); Taxpayers Against Fraud, FY 2005 False Claims Acts
Settlements, http://www.taf.org/total2005.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009); Taxpayers Against Fraud,
FY 2004 False Claims Acts Settlements, http://www.taf.org/total2004.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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B.

Using the FD&CAct to Punish Unlawful Drug Promotion

The DOJ's use of the False Claims Act as a punishment vehicle for unlawful
promotion has not replaced liability under the FD&C Act, which continues to be a
strong enforcement tool. The primary misbranding charges filed against the Purdue
Frederick Company (Purdue) in May 2007 were based on FD&C Act enforcement
options. 145 Purdue manufactures OxyContin, an opium-type analgesic derived from
the chemical oxycodone. 146 OxyContin, a prescription drug, was approved by the
FDA in 1995 for the management of moderate to high pain associated with injuries,

bursitis, dislocations, fractures, neuralgia, arthritis, lower back pain, and pain
associated with cancer. 147 Although approved as a controlled release painkiller, the
NDA for OxyContin did not claim superiority over immediate release oxycodone
or other pain medications. 148 Also, the NDA did not reference any clinical studies
149
showing that OxyContin was safer or more effective than other pain medications.
Nevertheless, from the time of its approval through June 2001, Purdue sales
representatives were instructed to promote OxyContin as less addictive, less subject
to abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other

pain medications. 150 During this time, sales of OxyContin generated approximately
$2.8 billion in revenue.' 5' During the same period, the annual number of
prescriptions for OxyContin increased from approximately 300,000 to 7.1
million.152 Following a four year investigation by federal and state law enforcement
groups working in cooperation, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District

145. Plea Agreement at 1, 12, United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va.
2007) (No. 1:07CR00029), available at http://www.vawd.uscourts.gov/PurdueFrederickCo/PleaAgreement-Purdue.pdf (in which Purdue pleaded guilty to violation of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C §§
331(a), 333(a)(2) (2006)). Although violations of the False Claims Act were also alleged, Purdue's
response to those charges represented only a small portion of the negotiated settlement and were not at
all the focus of the government's prosecution (only S160 million of the $634 million settlement was for
False Claims Act violations). Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office W. Dist. of Va., supra note 50.
146. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OxYCONTIN ABUSE AND DIVERSION
AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 1, 8

(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

d041 10.pdf.
147. Id.at 1; U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., OxyContin Description/Overview, http://www.usdoj.
gov/dea/concem/oxycontin.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). OxyContin is listed as a Schedule 11drug
by the Drug Enforcement Administration and has an abuse liability similar to morphine. Id.
148. Agreed Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569
(W.D. Va. 2007) (No. 1:07CR00029), available at http://www.vawd.uscourts.gov/PurdueFrederickCo/
Exhibit-B.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Id.at 5-6.
151. Id.at 2.
152. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supranote 146, at 31 tbl.2.
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of Virginia filed misbranding charges against Purdue, alleging that the company's
promotion of OxyContin was false and misleading under the FD&C Act.' 53
The crux of the government's case against Purdue focused on three specific
activities that the government alleged constituted misbranding. First, the
government alleged that Purdue trained its sales representatives to falsely promote
OxyContin as less addictive and less subject to abuse than other pain relief
medications. 154 Based on graphs that exaggerated the stability of blood levels
associated with OxyContin's controlled release formula, Purdue sales
representatives told health care providers that OxyContin had less euphoric effect
55
and less abuse potential than immediate release alternatives.
Second, based on an article published in a medical journal in March 2000, the
government alleged that Purdue promoted OxyContin as less likely to cause
withdrawal symptoms even when the product was discontinued abruptly. 156 The
article, which was drafted by Purdue, made positive claims about the withdrawal
effects of OxyContin despite Purdue's receipt of contrary analysis and awareness of
reports of adverse experiences related to withdrawal symptoms in a number of
patients. 157 For more than one year, Purdue relied on and distributed over ten
thousand reprints of the article to promote and market OxyContin as having fewer
withdrawal concerns than supported by Purdue's own data.158
Third, the government alleged that Purdue misbranded OxyContin by actively
misrepresenting the general statement: "Delayed absorption, as provided by
OxyContin tablets.., is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug. ' 159 The
government claimed that Purdue supervisors and employees falsely cited this
statement, which was part of the FDA-approved package insert for OxyContin, as
evidence that the drug, among other things, caused less euphoria, had less addiction

153. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office W. Dist. of Va., supra note 50; Laurence Hammack,
Maker of OxyContin Toughens Its Tablets, ROANOKE TIMES (Virginia), May 2, 2008, at Al (detailing
the timeline of the Purdue investigation from 2002 until the guilty plea in 2007). Other government
entities involved in the case against Purdue included the FDA's Office of Criminal Investigations, the
Internal Revenue Service's Criminal Investigation Division, the Department of Health and Human
Services' Office of Inspector General, the Department of Labor's Office of Inspector General, Defense
Criminal Investigative Service, and Virginia and West Virginia State Police. See Press Release, U.S.
Attorney's Office W. Dist. of Va., supra note 50.
154. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 148, at 5-6.
155. See id. at 6-9. These graphical data and statements had been specifically rejected by the FDA's
Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communication. Id. at 6-7.
156. Id. at 11-13.
157. Id. at 10-12.
158. Id. at 12-13.
159. Id. at 13-14.
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and abuse potential, and was less
likely to be diverted than immediate-release pain
160
medications of a similar nature.
Consistent with its approach of examining the collective impact of marketing
activities, the DOJ argued that Purdue engaged in an extensively orchestrated
scheme to disseminate false and misleading information about its approved drug to
physicians and other health care professionals in violation of the misbranding
provisions of the FD&C Act. 161 In May 2007, Purdue entered an agreement with
the United States, pleading guilty to felony misbranding of OxyContin with intent
to defraud and mislead under sections 33 1(a) and 333(a)(2) of the FD&C Act and
agreed to pay more than $600 million. 162 Of the Purdue settlement amount, which
far exceeded the criminal penalty recoverable solely under the penalty provisions of
the FD&C Act, 1 63 $276 million was forfeited to the United States; 64 $160 million
was allocated to federal and state government agencies to resolve claims under the
False Claims Act, at common law, and in equity for government healthcare
1 66
programs;1 65 and $130 million was designated to resolving private civil claims.
Additional amounts were paid to the Virginia Attorney General's Medicaid Fraud
Control Unit and to the Virginia Prescription Monitoring program. 167 Although the
government could have applied its theory of "inducement" under the False Claims
Act to Purdue's violations of the FD&C Act, the bulk of the monetary penalties

160. Id. For example, despite its own study suggesting otherwise, Purdue incorrectly represented that
it was more difficult to extract the oxycodone from an OxyContin tablet for intravenous abuse than from
similar drugs. Id. at 5-6.
161. Information at 5-6, 14, United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va.
2007) (No. 1:07CR00029), available at http://www.vawd.uscourts.gov/PurdueFrederickCo/ExhibitF.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supranote 146, at 16.
162. Plea Agreement, supra note 145, at 1, 3-7. The Plea Agreement was accepted by the District
Court two months later. U.S. v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 570, 576-77 (W.D. Va.
2007). The plea agreement also applied to three of Purdue's top executives, who pleaded guilty to
misdemeanor charges of misbranding in their capacities as responsible corporate officers and agreed to
pay a total of $34.5 million in fines. Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit over Marketing, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2007, at Al. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, the fines paid by the
Purdue executives are particularly troubling to the extent they suggest an increased willingness by the
DOJ to extract individual liability as part of settlement negotiations in these types of cases. Formal
litigation efforts against corporate executives in this manner have largely failed, with ten of eleven
executives acquitted in the case against TAP executives and all four of the Serono executives acquitted.
See David L. Douglass, FinancialRelationships in the Health CareIndustry: A Look at Lessons Gained
from Recent Cases and Settlements, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2006, at 6; Bruce Jaspen, TAP's Bill for
Lupron Grows; $150 Million Deal Covers Civil Suits, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 30, 2004, at C1; Ross Kerber,
Jury Acquits 4 in Serono Kickback Case; Verdict Delivers Blow to US Probe of Drug Industry, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 4, 2007, at C1.
163. See Plea Agreement, supra note 145, at 3 (stating that the statutory maximum fine was
$500,000).
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id. at 4-5.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Id. at 4.
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imposed on Purdue under the plea agreement were based on FD&C Act violations,
with the government relying on the equitable principle of disgorgement to justify
the large civil penalties imposed. 68 Theoretically, the blockbuster success of
OxyContin justified the government's large recovery.
Other prosecutions for unlawful promotion that have relied primarily on the
FD&C Act rather than the False Claims Act include a 2007 case against Pharmacia
& Upjohn Company, LLC (a subsidiary of Pfizer, Inc.) and a 2005 case against Eli
Lilly and Company. Pharmacia entered a deferred prosecution agreement and paid
a $15 million fine for promoting Genotropin, a human growth hormone drug, for
off-label anti-aging, cosmetic, and athletic performance enhancement uses. 1 69 Eli
Lilly entered a civil consent decree and paid $36 million for off-label promotion of
Evista, a prescription drug for osteoporosis. 170 The government alleged that Eli
Lilly sales representatives were trained to promote Evista for the prevention and
reduction in risk of breast cancer and cardiovascular disease.' 7 1 In both cases the
government was able to successfully negotiate settlement agreements for unlawful
promotion and to recover substantial monetary penalties under the FD&C Act
172
without resorting to use of the False Claims Act.
III. PUNISHING PROMOTION THAT VIOLATES THE FD&C ACT: WHY THE DOJ's
CURRENT ENFORCEMENT APPROACH IS THE WRONG

Rx

Punishing pharmaceutical companies that unlawfully promote their products
to deter future violations of the FD&C Act is consistent with the goals of
promoting and protecting the public health. False and misleading claims, whether

168. See, e.g., United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1053-54, 161 (10th Cir. 2006)
(explaining how the "disgorgement" justifies large civil penalties by deterring future violations that put
"public health and safety at risk"); United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 222, 225, 229,
234 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding "disgorgement" was a proper basis for civil fines and citing multiple
jurisdictions concurring with the "disgorgement" theory).
169. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office Dist. of Mass., Dep't of Justice, Pfizer Subsidiary Agrees
to Plead Guilty for Offering Kickback and Pay $19.68 Million Criminal Fine; Second Subsidiary Agrees
to Pay Additional $15 Million Penalty to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Promotion of Human Growth
Hormone (Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/Press%200ffice%20-%20Press
%20Release%2OFiles/Apr2007/Pharmacia-lnformation-Settlement.html.
170. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to OffLabel Promotion (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/
05 civ 685.html.
171. Id.
172. Michele L. Adelman & Catherine N. Caruga, A Low Dose Prescription:Criminal Prosecution
of Off-Label Promotion, BOSTON B. J., Nov.-Dec. 2007, at 17, 18-19, available at http://www.foley
hoag.com/-/media/Files/Publications/Generic/2007-11 -12-BBJ-Legal-Analysis-AdelmanKaruga.ashx;
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 169; but see Pfizer Unit Pleads Guilty, Prosecutors Praise
the Corporate Criminal,Not the Whistleblower, CORP. CRIME REP., Apr. 3, 2007, at 15, available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/pfizerO40307.htm (detailing a private False Claims Act suit
against Pharmacia that may have "triggered" the federal investigation, however, the government did not
join).
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about on-label or off-label uses, increase the potential for unnecessary and
dangerous risks to patients and undermine the FDA's mission of assuring that
approved drugs are safe and effective for their intended uses. But punishment
alone, even if financially successful, needs to be measured against the FDA's more
traditional procedures for advancing correction and compliance. Evidence that
financial punishment is actually deterring unlawful promotion under the FD&C Act
should be required before we assume that the DOJ's approach to enforcement is
promoting and protecting the public health. Granting the DOJ unfettered authority
to adopt enforcement approaches that may not be as effective as the FDA's
correction and compliance efforts is a mistake and inconsistent with the purposes of
the FD&C Act. Nor should we tolerate the DOJ's novel use of the False Claims Act
to enforce the FD&C Act without seriously testing the theory of causation upon
which it relies. Even if the DOJ's current enforcement approach to and use of the
False Claims Act are the most effective means of punishing and preventing
unlawful promotion under the FD&C Act, such means ought not to be adopted as
de rigueur without first surviving genuine judicial or congressional scrutiny. The
risk of exclusion from participation in federal health care programs should not fuel
the DOJ's ability to circumvent judicial review of its enforcement procedures; nor
should negotiated monetary fines, the amounts of which in some cases suggest
overreaching on the part of prosecutors, continue unchecked.
A. The DOJ's CurrentEnforcement Approach Subordinatesthe TraditionalPublic
Health Goals of Correction and Compliance Under the FD&CAct to
the Recovery of LargeFines
The DOJ's financial success in prosecuting unlawful promotion by
pharmaceutical companies over the past decade has occurred independent of the
FDA's more traditional focus on achieving timely correction and compliance of
individual labeling and advertising materials. 73 While it may be impossible to
know the extent to which the DOJ's prosecutorial decisions are influenced by the
potential for large monetary rewards, a company's ability and willingness to
negotiate a large settlement likely bears some weight and may even be more
relevant than the seriousness of the underlying promotional violation or the need to
correct the violation expeditiously. 74 Successful use of the False Claims Act as a

173. See generally Richard C. Ausness, "There's Danger Here, Cherie!": Liability for the
Promotion and Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devicesfor Off-Label Uses, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1253,
1259-64 (2008) (describing the DOJ's investigation and litigation in multiple cases as opposed to the
FDA's accusations and warnings).
174. Qui tam litigation can continue for years before a settlement or court decision is reached. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Barmak v. Sutter Corp., No. 95 CV 7637(KTD), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10446, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding against a qui tam plaintiff after an investigation and litigation
that lasted approximately seven years); United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d
39, 46 (D. Mass. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss a qui tam action in part almost five years after the
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punishment for FD&C Act violations, as measured by the hundreds of millions of
dollars recovered through settlement agreements, undoubtedly contributes to the
DOJ's evaluation of the financial incentives inherent in any proposed qui tam case.
Also contributing to the DOJ's increased focus on the recovery of large fines rather
than on the FD&C Act's twin purposes of promoting and protecting the public
health (achieved by the FDA through correction and compliance) is the absence of
any FDA role in the initial evaluation of unlawful promotion cases brought under
the False Claims Act. According to a recent government report, although FDA
entities within the agency are ultimately involved in the DOJ prosecutions of
unlawful promotion under the False Claims Act, at least during 2003 through 2007,
the FDA did not initiate any of the DOJ enforcement actions taken against
175
pharmaceutical manufacturers for unlawful promotion.
Most False Claims Act cases involving unlawful promotion are initiated by
qui tam plaintiffs who file notice of claims directly with the DOJ. 176 The ability of
qui tam plaintiffs to bypass preliminary review by FDA regulators experienced in
the area of drug labeling and advertising reduces the FDA's gate keeping role in the
initial evaluation of whether the promotion in question is actually unlawful. A
diminished role for FDA experts, who are specifically charged with implementing
the public health goals of the FD&C Act, appears to have contributed to the shift in
emphasis from correction and compliance to punishment, a shift that is not likely to
change in light of the DOJ's success in recovering substantial monetary fines for
unlawful promotion.
Now, regardless of whether it is focusing on enforcement options under the
False Claims Act (as it did in the Medicis case) or the FD&C Act (as it did in the
Purdue case), the DOJ appears committed to achieving deterrence through financial
penalties. 7 7 However, the advantages associated with focusing on correction and

initial filing); Anna Mae Walsh Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for Uncle Sam, 21 NOVA L. REv.

869, 882 (1997).
175. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 19.

176. Matthew, supra note 108, at 284, 308-19; see also Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note
97.
177. Since constructing its theory of False Claims Act liability, the DOJ has resorted to a mix and
match approach to the prosecution of unlawful promotion by pharmaceutical companies. Alleging
specific violations of the FD&C Act, the DOJ then decides whether to seek penalties under the False
Claims Act, the FD&C Act, or some combination thereof. For example, the 2006 Schering settlement on
Temodar included approximately $180 million of criminal penalties and $255 million in FD&C Act and
False Claims Act civil penalties. Press Release, Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney Dist. of Mass., supra
note 94, at 1-2. The 2005 case against Eli Lily for Evista promotion was settled solely under the FD&C
Act for $36 million. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 169. More recently, Bristol-Myers
Squibb settled False Claims Act allegations that included charges of off-label promotion of its drug
Abilify for more than $515 million (the company faced civil but not criminal charges by DOJ). Press
Release, Dep't of Justice, Bristol-Myers to Pay More than $515 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal
Drug Marketing and Pricing (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/
September/07_civ_782.html.
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compliance should not be cast aside without careful consideration of the impact on
the FD&C Act's primary goal of promoting and protecting the public health.
B. Use of the False Claims Act to Punish Unlawful Promotion Marginalizesthe
FDA 's Expertise in a Way that Undercuts the Public Health Goalsof
the FD&CAct
The DOJ's implementation of its False Claims Act theory of liability heralded
a dramatic change in the government's approach to unlawful promotional activity
by pharmaceutical companies. Prior to the suggestion in United States ex rel.
Franklin v. Parke-Davis that the False Claims Act might be a valid enforcement
tool against unlawful drug promotion, 7 8 concerns about drug labeling and
advertising were generally handled within the FDA by its Division of Drug
Marketing, Advertising, and Communications (DDMAC), which is responsible for
prescription drugs,' 79 and by the Office of Compliance and Biologics Quality
(OCBQ), which monitors promotional activities for biological products.' 80
Consistent with the intent of the FD&C Act to promote and protect the public
health, DDMAC and OCBQ strive to ensure that promotional labeling and
advertising information is not false, lacking in fair balance (i.e., between the drug's
risks and benefits), or otherwise misleading.181
Enforcement activity undertaken by FDA regulators tends to be flexible and is
usually initiated by a regulatory compliance (untitled or warning) letter that objects
to specific claims made in promotional labeling or advertising and provides an
opportunity for the company to communicate and negotiate with the FDA about
appropriate marketing messages. 82 In most cases, companies comply with the
agency's directives regarding allegedly unlawful promotional activity, or respond

178. See Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 50-53.
179. Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins. The Development of Direct-to-Consumer
PrescriptionDrug Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 423, 429-30 (2002).
180. Suzanne M. Sensabaugh, A Primer on CBER's Regulatory Review Structure and Process, 32
DRUG INFO. J. 1011, 1016-17 (1998).
181. See Mark E. Boulding, The Statutory Basisfor FDA Regulation of Scientific and Educational
Information, 4 J. PHARMACY & L. 123, 123, 128, 131 (1995); Sensabaugh, supra note 180, at 1017; Div.
of Drug Mktg., Adver., & Commc'ns, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Description, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ucm090142.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
182. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., supra note 22, at 53-54. The Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research maintains a database of untitled and warning letters sent out to companies
since 1997. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Warning
Letters and Notice of Violation Letters to Pharmaceutical Companies, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeof
ViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM055773 (follow hyperlinks to choose a specific year)
(last visited Nov. 20, 2009). The FDA also maintains a searchable database of warning letters sent by the
District Offices of individual states. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Warning Letters, http://www.fda.gov/ICEClUEnforcementActions/WamingLetters/default.htm
(last
visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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to the objections raised and reach some mutually agreeable resolution with
DDMAC or OCBQ. 83 Only if the parties are unable to agree is further action
sought through the FDA's Office of Chief Counsel or the DOJ's Office of
Consumer Litigation. 184 Under those circumstances, civil and criminal enforcement
actions under the FD&C Act may include, among other options, injunction
proceedings, negotiated consent decrees, and seizures. 185 Rarely do cases escalate
efforts focus on achieving
to those formal levels; overall, the FDA's enforcement
86
correction and compliance, not punishment.'
In contrast, when the False Claims Act is the primary vehicle for punishing
companies that violate the FD&C Act, qui tam plaintiffs commonly initiate
enforcement, not FDA regulatory personnel with expertise in the area of unlawful
drug promotion.' 87 Consequently, because the DOJ is the lead agency on False
Claims Act cases aimed at unlawful drug promotion, initial prosecutorial discretion
is transferred from the FDA-the agency specifically designated by Congress to
promote and protect the public health-to an entity whose primary focus is high
profile criminal enforcement of health care fraud and whose expertise in the area of
drug labeling and advertising is limited. 88 When the FDA is less involved in
decisions of whether and to what extent to prosecute unlawful promotional activity,
there is inevitably a significant loss of expertise in evaluating the legal status of
information and its public health benefits in accordance with the FD&C Act.
Consistent with its congressionally mandated mission to protect the public
health, when the FDA considers the substantive content and impact of promotional
labeling and advertising, its primary goal is to ensure that information is not false

183. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 19 (stating the "drug companies have
generally complied with ... directives as suggested in [warning and untitled] letters" from DDMAC).
184. See Mary Olson, Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives, 12 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 376, 385 (1996) (describing the great cost associated with litigation and the "[thirteen]
levels of hierarchical approval" before seizures or injunctions are sent to the Office of the Chief
Counsel). Multiple types of litigation are open to the FDA. See sources cited supra notes 32-33.
185. See sources cited supra notes 32-33; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Cardinal
Health 303, Inc. Signs Amended Consent Decree with FDA (Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/NewsroomI/PressAnnouncements/ucm I49530.htm.
186. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 6 (comparing the FDA's issuance
of warning letters to the DOJ's enforcement actions, which resulted in settlements); Arthur K. Yellin,
FDA Prescription Drug Enforcement Policies and Techniques, 42 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 552, 556, 558
(1987).
187. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 97 (stating that almost 78% of False Claims Act
recoveries were "associated with suits initiated by private citizens").
188. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 6; Zalesky, supra note 105, at 247-48.
The Attorney General's role as the lawyer for the United States allows that once a lawsuit is filed, even
if by a qui tam relator, the Attorney General and DOJ wield exclusive authority to decide how to
proceed in a given matter, with or without the consent of FDA. Although the 2008 GAO Report
indicates that FDA regulators are involved in the resolution of DOJ's enforcement actions, the extent of
that role is not discussed. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 6.
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or misleading. 189 The FDA's regulatory expertise enables the agency to balance that
goal against the benefits of encouraging the free exchange of scientific information,
which is not unlawful and upon which many health care providers and patients
rely.190 For example, determinations about the extent to which information about
off-label uses should be allowed under the rules for scientific and educational
information' 9' and where dissemination of information amounts to unlawful
promotion are complicated and have long been debated among the FDA, Congress,
health care professionals, industry, consumers, and other groups. 92 Even as the
DOJ continues to sift through its pipeline of potential False Claims Act cases, many
of which focus on the promotion of off-label uses and promotional schemes alleged
to include the distribution of misbranded drugs,1 93 the FDA has been working on a
guidance document on the dissemination of information on off-label uses that
would expand the ability of pharmaceutical companies to provide health care
practitioners with medical journal studies of unapproved uses for drugs. 194 As

189. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., supra note 11, at 7; U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., What We Do, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2009). In contrast, under the DOJ's False Claims Act theory, it may be that even truthful off-label
marketing may give rise to a "false" claim. See Lansdale, supra note 99, at 161 (commenting on Judge
Saris' decision in United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis).
190. Guidance for Industry, Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg.
64,093, 64,095 (Dec. 3, 1997).
The agency traditionally has recognized the important public policy reasons not to regulate
all industry-supported activities as advertising or labeling. To permit industry support for the
full exchange of views in scientific and educational discussions, including discussions of
unapproved uses, FDA has distinguished between those activities supported by companies
that are nonpromotional and otherwise independent from the substantive influence of the
supporting company and those that are not. Those activities that have been deemed by the
agency to be independent from influence by the supporting company and nonpromotional
have not been treated as advertising or labeling, and have not been subjected to the agency's
regulatory scrutiny.
Id. The treatment of cancer, pediatric, and rare "orphan" diseases often depend on access to off-label
information. Alexander T. Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-Label Drug Prescribing,
5 INDEP. REv. 25, 26, 28 (2000).
191. See Joseph Leghorn et al., The FirstAmendment and FDA Restrictions on Off-Label Uses: The
Callfor a New Approach, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 396-403 (2008) (analyzing different types of
dissemination by manufacturers, such as scientific, promotional, commercial and hybrid forms, and
when such dissemination is allowed); James O'Reilly & Amy Dalai, Off-Label or Out of Bounds?
Prescriberand Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANN. HEALTH L.
295, 309-15 (2003) (discussing the First Amendment right for companies to disseminate off-label uses
for scientific and educational purposes).
192. O'Reilly & Dalai, supra note 191, at 306-07 (discussing such debates in multiple court cases).
These regulatory "gray areas" are of just the sort identified by Krause as least appropriate for "punitive
penalties ... especially when the allegations are resolved by settlement." Krause, supra note 110, at
206-10, 213-14.
193. George S. Craft, Jr., PromotingOff-Label in Pursuitof Profit: An Examination of a Fraudulent
Business Model, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 103, 105-06, 127-28 (2007).
194. See Draft Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical
Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of
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suggested by Krause, clarifying these regulatory "gray areas" should be one of the
first steps in ensuring that the DOJ's application of the False Claims Act to
activity is accepted as a reasonable, fair, and coherent
unlawful promotional
195
enforcement option.
The DOJ's use of the False Claims Act to punish unlawful promotional
activity requires no special deference to the FDA's expertise. Furthermore, even to
the extent the DOJ consults with the FDA on whether application of the False
Claims Act is appropriate, the DOJ likely lacks sufficient motivation to consistently
defer to the FDA's judgment and expertise in matters of pharmaceutical promotion.
The combined attraction of qui tam plaintiffs willing and able to assume
responsibility for the initial investigation into companies' promotional practices
with the opportunity for large recoveries likely decreases the DOJ's inclination to
value the FDA's interpretation of the FD&C Act. Rather, its successful use of the
False Claims Act in Parke-Davis and other cases suggests that the DOJ will
continue the shift from achieving correction and compliance with the FD&C Act to
punishing pharmaceutical companies financially. As evidenced by the press
releases touting settlements for unlawful promotion cases over the past few years,
while correction and compliance are included in the concessions obtained from
pharmaceutical companies, 196 the impact of such punishment on manufacturers'
actual behavior appears to have assumed a position of secondary importance with
the large financial rewards garnering the vast amount of DOJ and media
197
attention.

Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 9342 (Feb. 20, 2008); U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 73, at 3.
195. Krause, supra note 110, at 213-14.
196. Greene, supra note 108, at 42-43 & n.9; Office of Inspector Gen., supra note 51. Settlement
agreements calculate the amounts to be paid by companies facing prosecution for unlawful promotion.
Correction and compliance goals are achieved by requiring that companies alter and monitor their sales
and marketing schemes. To the extent False Claims Act prosecutions impact pharmaceutical behavior it
is through separate Corporate Integrity Agreements. Greene, supra note 108, at 42.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) often negotiates compliance obligations with health
care providers and other entities as part of the settlement of Federal health care program
investigations arising under a variety of civil false claims statutes. A provider or entity
consents to these obligations as part of the civil settlement and in exchange for the OIG's
agreement not to seek an exclusion of that health care provider or entity from participation in
Providers who settle these
Medicare, Medicaid and other Federal health care programs ....
cases often deny that they were liable or that they committed the alleged conduct.
Office of Inspector Gen., supra note 51. When the enforcement vehicle is the FD&C Act, the same
results are achieved by Consent Decree. See Schering-Plough GMP Consent Decree Puts Drug Industry
on Notice, FOOD & DRUG LETTER, June 7, 2002, at 1, 1.
197. See Greene, supra note 108, at 42-43 & n.9 (noting how "corporate integrity agreements" are a
part of off-label promotion settlements, yet citing several news headlines stressing the monetary portion
of settlements); see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 43; Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, supra note 97.
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To the extent the DOJ remains committed to elevating punishment of
unlawful promotional cases beyond available administrative remedies, DOJ
prosecutors will continue to exercise significant discretionary authority and control
over such cases. Based on financial incentives alone, in deciding whether particular
cases warrant prosecution, the DOJ may be inclined to usurp and undervalue the
FDA's goals of correction and compliance and to rely less on the agency's
expertise in assessing the legitimacy of unlawful promotion claims under the
FD&C Act. And as long as the DOJ's successful enrichment of the public coffers
persists, it seems unlikely to consider abandoning the False Claims Act route to
large monetary recoveries. If the goals of promoting and protecting the public
health under the FD&C Act are truly paramount, the FDA should be afforded an
early and substantive role in the decision of whether prosecution is warranted.
C. Use of the False ClaimsAct to Punish Unlawful Promotion Turns on a
Questionable Theory of Causationand Should Not Be Used in Lieu of
the FD&CAct
The DOJ's application of the False Claims Act to pharmaceutical companies
that engage in promotional activity that violates the FD&C Act is founded on the
premise that such activity "induces" physicians to file false claims. 198 The DOJ's
reliance on this idea of inducement to support the causation required under the
99
False Claims Act is fairly novel and has yet to survive serious judicial scrutiny.'
Because to date the prosecution of unlawful promotion under the False Claims Act
almost always resulted in negotiated settlements, pharmaceutical manufacturers
lack the benefit of precedent and reliable information on which to base decisions
about the legitimacy of the DOJ's use of the False Claims Act.200 While the False
Claims Act has long been used to combat improper billing, inadequate services,
and other traditional health care fraud by doctors, hospitals, and healthcare
providers, its application to pharmaceutical companies in the context of drug
promotion is relatively new.20' The DOJ's use of the False Claims Act as a sword

198. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. Civ.A. 96-11651PBS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15754, at *11-19 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (stating that the relationship between off-label promotion
and physician prescription practices may satisfy the causation prong of the False Claims Act); Greene,
supra note 108, at 43-44.
199. Greene, supra note 108, at 64 ("The [Parke-Davis]court's conclusions about the viability of a
False Claims Act claim based on off-label promotion undoubtedly contributed to the settlement of this
case."). The denial of summary judgment in Parke-Davis,on which DOJ relies, merely held that the qui
tam plaintiff had presented a viable theory and enough evidence of causation to avoid summary
dismissal. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *17-19. To date, no court has had an opportunity to
consider the merits of the theory or ultimate liability after trial.
200. See Nicole Huberfeld, Pharma on the Hot Seat, 40 J. HEALTH L. 241, 243-45 (2007).
201. Paul E. Kalb, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 282 JAMA 1163, 1164-65 (1999); see Parke
Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 (analyzing whether to broaden False Claims Act claims to apply to
pharmaceutical companies).
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against pharmaceutical companies to induce settlement for unlawful promotion has
been incredibly successful, 20 2 giving the DOJ little incentive to question its
application of the False Claims Act to these promotion cases or to entertain doubt
about its causation theory. Thus, unless forced to do so, the DOJ seems unlikely to
abandon its aggressive prosecution of unlawful promotion, whether it is acting
against off-label (unapproved) uses or on-label (approved) uses. Rather, the more
likely scenario is that the DOJ will continue to expand application of and stretch
remedies under the False Claims Act to unlawful promotion by pharmaceutical
companies.
The willingness of companies to settle False Claims Act charges lends an
unfair air of appropriateness to the DOJ's use of the False Claims Act in the context
of promotional labeling and advertising. Under the provisions of the False Claims
Act, liability is premised on specific claims filed for payment.2 3 Unlike other
health care fraud situations, where actual claims are identified as false based on
substantial factual information related to the claim, 20 4 the DOJ's settlements of
cases against promotional labeling and advertising generally allege wholesale
violations tied to promotional schemes, without proof that each prescription for
which a claim for reimbursement is filed with Medicare or Medicaid is a false
claim.20 5 The one court that has considered the reasonableness of this type of broad
sweeping approach to connecting companies' promotional activities and the filing
of individual false claims dismissed the qui tam plaintiffs case as impossible to
prove.206
The case against Purdue for its promotion of OxyContin illustrates how the
DOJ's application of the False Claims Act to drug promotion that violates the
FD&C Act portends the continued expansion of an unreasonable theory of
causation designed primarily to maximize financial punishment. As noted
previously, the DOJ's theory of False Claims Act liability starts with the premise
that a pharmaceutical manufacturer's unlawful promotion of a prescription drug
induces or causes a physician or other health care provider to file a false claim for
reimbursement with Medicare or Medicaid.20 7 Because liability attaches to
individual claims, theoretically, the government must separately examine each

202. See Greene, supra note 108, at 42 & n.9.
203. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006).
204. See Kalb, supranote 201, at 1164-65.
205. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 24 tbl.3, 28 tbl.4 (listing FDA's
narrow regulatory letters and the DOJ settlements and alleged actions based on broad marketing
schemes). Scrutinized individually, some portion of the claims collectively designated as false by the
DOJ would likely qualify for reimbursement under the provisions for compendia drugs, the practice of
medicine, or some other legitimate basis.
206. United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc., No. 4:05CV570MLM, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22449 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
207. Hall & Berlin, supra note 52, at 658.
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request for reimbursement and determine that the request was caused by the
pharmaceutical company's allegedly unlawful promotion and was a claim that the
government should not have paid. 20 8 To prove that a claim was improperly paid, the
government must establish that the prescription for which reimbursement was
sought was not medically necessary.209 When the second prong of the test is applied
to individual prescriptions in the context of unlawful promotion of on-label uses,
the DOJ's causation theory is particularly problematic.
In Purdue, the DOJ challenged the legitimacy of reimbursements for
OxyContin prescriptions based on allegations that Purdue falsely motivated doctors
to prescribe OxyContin by claiming, among other things, that OxyContin was less
addictive than similar drugs for pain.2 10 Because the allegedly unlawful
promotional claims were directly related to the approved uses of OxyContin, part of
the universe of false claims would have included prescriptions written for patients
who legitimately needed to manage pain. For any prescription written under those
circumstances, the government would not have been able to establish that the claim
for reimbursement was false because the prescription was for a medically necessary
drug for which the government was obligated to pay. Thus, even if Purdue was
responsible for promoting misperceptions that encouraged doctors to prescribe
OxyContin based partially on false and misleading information, many of the
individual prescriptions for OxyContin likely qualified as medically necessary and
were legitimately submitted for reimbursement. Avoiding judicial review of its
enforcement approach allowed the DOJ to successfully circumvent any need to
establish the false nature of reimbursement requests on a claim-by-claim basis.
Although the use of the FD&C Act against Purdue was only a limited part of the
prosecution for unlawful promotion, its application mirrors the weakness of the
DOJ's causation theory under the False Claims Act.21'
Thus far, the DOJ seems to be limiting its enforcement focus to cases where it
can tie flagrant violation of promotional guidelines by companies to increased
prescription patterns in support of the but for causation necessary for a False
Claims Act violation.212 While such behavior by pharmaceutical manufacturers is
reprehensible, Congress and the courts should not tolerate a practice of forcing

208. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22449 at *3-6.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(l) (2006).
210. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 148, at 5.
211. See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2007). The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2130-31
(2008), also suggests that the DOJ's theory of inducement in unlawful promotion cases may be too
broad to withstand judicial scrutiny. The Court's holding indicates that in addition to proving that a
pharmaceutical company made a false statement to a prescribing physician about a drug, the government
would need to prove that the company intended the false statement to cause the government to pay the
claim in order to establish False Claims Act liability. Id. at 2130.
212. See Greene, supra note 108, at 63.
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companies to pay amounts that by their very size call into question the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. Given the lack of probability that the DOJ could prove
each alleged false claim in the unlawful promotion cases that satisfies the
requirements of the False Claims Act, some reasonable basis for justifying the
settlement numbers is required. At the very least, if the DOJ is going to continue
using the False Claims Act in this manner, assurance that the FDA is involved in
influencing prosecutorial discretion and policing the cases brought by individuals
should be transparent.
Having pioneered this theory of causation under the False Claims Act to
punish unlawful promotion, the DOJ bears some responsibility for its embracement
by qui tam plaintiffs and state governments, especially now that numerous states
are passing their own State False Claims Acts modeled after the federal False
Claims Act. 213 As a result of these new statutory options, we should anticipate that
many more qui tam plaintiffs will file suits in state courts. In state cases it is even
less likely any uniform federal interpretation and application of the FD&C Act can
be guaranteed. If we make it easier for whistleblowers to bring cases on their own,
private attorneys will act without the benefit of the FDA's expertise in interpreting
the FD&C Act. When a state court adopts a qui tam plaintiffs interpretation of the
FD&C Act, precedent will be set (as compared to settlements that apply only to the
parties involved). Merely declining to intervene in cases that it views as
unwarranted is likely not enough to contain the individual plaintiff suits and the
misinterpretation of the FD&C Act that may result. 21 4 Rather, the DOJ should
accept responsibility by intervening in cases that it does not support and moving for
dismissal.
In lieu of the DOJ's current approach to unlawful promotion by
pharmaceutical manufacturers, such activity should be prosecuted solely under the
FD&C Act, which is the statutory scheme established by Congress. Any DOJ
concerns that the remedies available under the False Claims Act are uniquely suited
to motivate companies to comply with FD&C Act promotional restrictions are
misplaced. Combining the penalty provisions in the FD&C Act with the doctrine of
equitable disgorgement is sufficient to punish promotional activities that violate the
FD&C Act and provide a preferable long-term approach to the continued use of the
legally questionable theory of causation asserted by the DOJ in claims prosecuted
under the False Claims Act.

213. See, e.g., Florida False Claims Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.081-09 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009);
New Jersey False Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:32C-1 to -17 (Supp. 2008); Delaware False Claims
and Reporting Act, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 1201-09 (2005).
214. For example, certain aspects of the decision in United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo,
Inc. could be read as inconsistent with prevailing FDA policy. No. 4:05CV570MLM, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22449, at *1-3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2006).
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PUNISHING PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES

D. The DOJ's Reliance on Negotiated Settlements to Punish Unlawful Promotion Is
Legally Coercive and also Undermines the Public Health Goals of the FD&CAct
The DOJ has been able to sidestep judicial scrutiny of its interpretation and
application of the False Claims Act to unlawful promotion cases largely because of
the potential for exclusion from participation in federal programs faced by
companies threatened with prosecution. 215 Exclusion from reimbursement under the
Social Security Act, which threatens manufacturers with the loss of the right to
participate in federal health care programs, perpetuates manufacturers' willingness
to settle with the DOJ rather than risk imposition of the penalty. By holding
companies hostage, the DOJ further undermines confidence that its punitive goals
are consistent with the public health purposes of the FD&C Act and confirms its
message that companies are powerless to challenge the government's
characterization of their promotional materials.
It is incumbent upon the DOJ to exercise discretion and resist the temptation
to impose inappropriate and unsubstantiated monetary and other settlements.
Similar restraint should be exercised when relying on the FD&C Act to punish
unlawful promotion by pharmaceutical companies. Including secondary False
Claims Act charges in order to threaten companies with debarment, and basing
disgorgement calculations on theoretical rather than actual numbers, results in
unsubstantiated and unfair monetary awards that will ultimately be passed on to
consumers in the form of higher health care costs. If such a result is reached
without a corresponding increase in correction and compliance in pharmaceutical
labeling and advertising, the public health goals of the FD&C Act are reduced to a
secondary role that diminishes confidence that the government can be relied upon
to promote and protect the public health.
CONCLUSION

The government's success in recovering large financial settlementsexemplified by the Medicis, Purdue, and other recent cases-suggests that
regardless of the enforcement vehicle, the DOJ has succeeded in shifting the focus
on labeling and promotion of pharmaceutical products from correction and
compliance to punishment. Because the FD&C Act may be just as effective an
enforcement tool as the False Claims Act, serious consideration of the legal and
practical concerns associated with relying on the False Claims Act to prosecute
unlawful promotion under the FD&C Act is warranted. Legitimate debate about the
nature of pharmaceutical labeling and advertising is a necessary part of ensuring
that the FD&C Act's goals of promoting and protecting the public health are
realized. Those goals are undermined when such conversations are avoided in the

215. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006) (allowing exclusion from participation in federal programs
for False Claims Act violations).
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pursuit of large monetary settlements that are negotiated without any judicial
review of the underlying substantive legal issues.

